Dairy farmer check-off contributions are used to fund a variety of generic commodity promotion programs. Historically, generic advertising of fluid milk and cheese have constituted the majority share of check-off budgets for dairy products. In recent years, however, slow growth in dairy farmer check-off revenues, combined with sharp increases in media advertising costs, has prompted a shift away from generic advertising to other nonadvertising commodity promotion activities.

Recently, new store-level marketing efforts by the American Dairy Association and Dairy Council (ADADC) have focused on implementing retail category management (CM) programs for fluid milk products in the dairy case – the Dairy Case Management Program (DCMP). This program aims to improve the management, appearance, and operation of the dairy case in retail stores, with the ultimate goal of increasing per capita milk consumption. Retailers have long recognized category management as a promotional tool for marketing their products, and grocery retailers have applied various methods of using space in dairy cases to encourage consumers to buy dairy products. The CM process involves managing product categories as strategic business units and customizing them on a store-by-store basis to satisfy customer needs.

The expectation of increased sales provides an incentive for retailers to adopt CM programs. However, to milk producers who fund DCMP efforts through their check-off investments, the underlying expectation is that these activities will increase consumption. A CM program aimed at understanding consumer preferences and strategically redefining a category accordingly should increase sales growth. It is reasonable then to hypothesize that a successful multi-store/market application could increase overall market sales volume and per capita consumption levels. To test this hypothesis we investigate a case-study application of the DCMP in the Hudson Valley region of New York State.

The Hudson Valley DCMP

ADADC DCMP staff worked with ProCorp USA, Inc., a marketing agency specializing in category management, to conduct retail store programs and work with retail/category managers. Program personnel provided multiple store visits per week during the duration of the eight-week program cycle and worked closely with retail store staff to improve stock control procedures by evaluating ordering, variety, hygiene, and rotation procedures. In addition, alternative dairy case designs (i.e., planograms) were developed to consider shelf management and presentation of the product.

Various evaluative tools were used to measure the progress in achieving program objectives. Our focus is directed towards two such tools – weekly store Benchmark Scores and store fluid milk sales volumes. Weekly Benchmark Reports (BMR) were prepared to provide overall store scores encompassing five benchmark categories – planogram, hygiene, rotation, stockweight, and ordering. The planogram benchmark relates to acceptability of the display case through proper placement of pricing tickets and adherence to the recommended case design. Hygiene relates to the overall cleanliness and appearance of the display case. Rotation relates to maintaining a regular rotation schedule for proper movement of product. Stockweight relates to having appropriate levels of stock in both the display case and coolroom. Ordering deals with balancing ordering levels with product movement to prevent low stockweights and out of stocks. The scoring system is an
indication of each store’s weekly progress and the scores reflect the number of benchmarks achieved during the course of that week.

Another important tool to evaluate store progress from the DCMP is a comparison of monthly sales of fluid milk products over time. Sales data were collected on a monthly, volume basis with individual products specified by Universal Product Code (UPC). Milk products were classified into three types: (i) Standard Milk – standard, unflavored fluid milk products in packages greater than 16 ounces, (ii) Beverage Milk – flavored fluid milk products and unflavored fluid milk products in packages of 16 ounces or less, and (iii) Lactaid Milk – all lactaid fluid milk products. The monthly sales figures compare sales (in volume sold) for six months – two months prior to program operation, two months during program operation, and two months after program operation. In addition, monthly sales figures are compared to the previous year’s sales.

The Hudson Valley Region DCMP program was conducted in the summer of 2002, with over 200 stores participating, and run in four separate cycles by geographic area (Figure 1). Store participation in the region included 65% of all supermarket, mass merchant, convenience, and drug stores, and accounted for over 91% of average weekly volume (in total store dollars). The Northwestern Hudson Valley Market area (cycle 3) is located primarily in the northwest geographical area of the Hudson Valley territory and is the focus of this case study. A total of 61 retail stores completed the duration of the in-store DCMP in the Northwestern Hudson Valley Market area. The eight-week program cycle ran from July 2002 through August 2002. A wide array of store types participated, including 25 convenience stores, 16 drug stores, 16 supermarkets, and 4 mass merchants.

**DCMP Benchmark Achievement**

To get a sense of store progress during the eight-week DCMP, we computed volume-weighted average weekly benchmark scores by store type, and subsequently, we normalized them on a basis of 100 (Figure 2). One would expect improvement in benchmark scores during the DCMP period, and this result appears to have occurred across all store types following some transition in the first few weeks. The declines in average scores in the last week of the program, particularly for supermarkets and mass merchants, offset statistical gains from the scores evident in weeks six and seven, and highlight the need for continual evaluation in adherence to DCMP objectives.

Looking more closely at the types of benchmark deficiency, we can identify specific problems in stores not achieving full compliance. Figure 3 displays the (weighted) percentage
of all stores not achieving particular benchmarks by program week. Early in the program, attention was directed mostly to hygiene and planogram deficiencies; however, both benchmark categories showed substantial improvement over the program period. Stocking issues were evident by week four, presumably as product variety and planogram changes occurred, but decreased to near zero by the end of the program cycle.

When the ordering benchmark was first introduced in week four, problems were evident in about 15% of stores; these were likely due, in part, to changes in product mix with a revised planogram design and the need to reconfigure ordering schedules with suppliers. Rotation issues seemed the least problematic throughout the program period. However, after early rotation problems appeared to have been resolved, new problems appeared to return during the final week of the program period and may be indicative of subsequent changes in planogram design without updating and balancing supply schedules.

Benchmark deficiencies differentiated by store type provide program staff information on areas of focus. While not differentiated in Figure 3, hygiene issues needed relatively more attention in convenience stores and supermarkets, while problems in planograms were most evident in convenience and drug stores. Ordering concerns were not of issue in smaller stores, but they did need attention in the higher-volume supermarkets and mass merchants. Stocking concerns were most evident in mass merchant stores, whose general display is dominated by larger, quickly moving volume, but with limited numbers of individual products.

**Store Sales Volume Comparison**

Store size and sales volume of fluid milk products varied widely across participating stores. Average daily volume (ADV) sales for all participating stores exceeded 11,000 total gallons during the study period, or 192 gallons per day per store on average. As expected, this movement was dominated by supermarket sales, covering 63% of total milk sales in the area. Mass merchants (18%) and convenience stores (15%) also were significant contributors to total milk movement, with drug stores lagging further behind (5%).

As expected, the predominant source of milk movement on a vol-
Volume basis was standard, unflavored fluid milk products (96%). Gains in beverage milk products were evident in all store types since 2001, but relative volume movement was small at 6% of fluid milk sales, with the largest proportion sold in convenience stores. Lactaid products represented the smallest proportion of volume and were sold almost exclusively in supermarkets.

Year-to-year changes in sales volume (ADV) for the May through October sales period for standard, beverage, and lactaid milk were +5.6%, +16.6%, and -3.0%, respectively (Figure 4). While sales changes in standard milk varied across store types, gains in beverage milk sales consistently were positive. This result was expected, given the program emphasis on increasing products and facings of popular beverage products. The overall 3% sales volume loss in lactaid products was largely the result of lower volume sales in one month of 2002 (July), just as the DCMP entered the retail stores.

**DCMP Sales Impacts**

Using the monthly sales data described above, regression analysis was used to estimate volume changes due to the DCMP in the Northwestern Hudson Valley Market stores. Regression analysis is a useful tool for isolating independent sources of variation in explanatory variables to variation in the dependent variable of interest. Both overall market volume impacts of the DCMP and sales volume impacts by store and product type were estimated (for details see Schmit, Kaiser, & Chung, 2004). Supermarkets and mass merchants were classified into a “large store” category, while convenience and drug stores were classified into a “small store” category.

Recall that the DCMP in-store period occurred during the eight weeks of July and August 2002. While many of the DCMP recommendations may have been instituted during this time, continual changes occurred throughout the in-store program. In addition, it was felt that longer-run DCMP sales impacts should be estimated after the time period when program staff visited the stores so that impacts would be based on actual store management following the program cycle. Therefore, the period September through October 2002 was selected for measuring volume changes attributable to the DCMP, after accounting for other independent sources of variation.

Estimated DCMP impacts indicated that the program was effective at increasing ADV across all stores, on average, 4.40%. Using the average store ADV of 192 gallons per day, this result implies store ADV gains of 8.44 gallons per day. The DCMP was relatively more effective in supermarkets and mass merchants (ADV gain of 5.25%) than in convenience and drug stores (ADV gain of 4.05), and resulted in ADV gains across all products of 24.17 and 2.20 gallons per day, respectively. The larger relative percentage gains for supermarkets and mass merchants were to be expected, due in part to more flexibility in space use in these store types.

Given that the dominant share of total milk volume movement is due to sales of standard fluid milk products, it was not surprising that gains in this volume largely mirror the overall product results. ADV gains for standard, unflavored milk from the DCMP were positive and significant for both store classes, with gains of 5.22 and 4.08% for supermarkets/mass merchants and convenience/drug stores, respectively. Strong volume gains in the largest dairy case category are encouraging evidence of the program’s effectiveness in moving more milk in both smaller and larger stores.

While DCMP efforts emphasized increases in space allocations for beverage products (i.e., around 4% based on planogram recommendations), average store volume impacts
were not statistically different from zero. This combined-store result was realized by decreased volume in convenience/drug stores, offset by statistically significant gains in supermarkets and mass merchants. A closer examination shows that general volume changes were higher during the eight-week in-store program and then they dropped off during the two-month evaluation period. This result may indicate that increases in volume of beverage products were better attained under the close monitoring of program implementation during the market cycle, and that a loss of program integrity and operational design occurred after in-store visits. This situation is likely due to the large number of individual beverage products cycled through store displays and increased influences by wholesale distributors and merchandisers.

Lactaid milk volume across all stores showed a relatively large percentage increase due to DCMP efforts of over 9%. DCMP volume gains in the lactaid product category were evident from both store type classes, but stronger influences were attributed to the larger stores where lactaid milk products are primarily available. While volume movement of lactaid products is relatively small, given the more recent introduction of lactose-reduced products in the dairy case, positive volume gains from this program was a promising result.

Evaluating Effectiveness
The sales model estimates indicated that the DCMP was effective at increasing sales volume in participating program stores. To put these estimates in proper perspective, it is necessary to value the incremental volume relative to the costs of the program. Considering the estimated ADV gain for all products across all stores and assuming the volume gain is maintained over a full year implies additional annual market value to producers of approximately $48,000. Given the total cost of the program of approximately $122,000 (roughly $2,000 per store), this finding implies that, assuming maintained sales enhancement, the program would pay for itself in 2.5 years. Viewed from a longer-term structural change in management perspective, this payoff timeline may be acceptable. However, the absence of immediate or short-run net gains underscores the importance of implementing a long-run management strategy, with continual evaluation for the program to be successful.

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Wall Street vs. Main Street: What are the Benefits and Costs of Wal-Mart to Local Communities?

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“In business, there is big and there is Wal-Mart.”
--- BusinessWeek, October 6, 2003

So begins a recent report about the wide-ranging influence of Wal-Mart. To get a sense of just how big Wal-Mart is, consider the following:

• Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. is the world’s largest retailer, with $285.2 billion in sales in the fiscal year ending Jan. 31, 2005 (Wal-Mart, 2006).

• The company employs 1.2 million employees in the United States and 1.6 million worldwide. Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in the United States (Wal-Mart, 2006).

• Wal-Mart’s estimated $18 billion purchases from China in 2004 represent 10% of all U.S. imports from China (Lahart, 2005).

• Wal-Mart controls a large share of retail business done by almost every major U.S. consumer-products company; it accounts for 28% of Dial total sales, 24% of Del Monte Foods, 23% of Clorox, and 23% of Revlon (Bianco & Zellner, 2003).


Despite these successes or perhaps because of them, America has a love-hate relationship with Wal-Mart. The company is revered on Wall Street for its growth and business success, but often reviled on Main Street for driving out mom and pop retailers. Just what are the local benefits and costs of a Wal-Mart store opening up in a community?

A review of the recent academic research that addresses the question of the local impacts of Wal-Mart and other supercenters shows that there are clear benefits and costs associated with supercenter retail stores, and that they are unevenly distributed across employees, shoppers, other businesses and local communities. Here, we provide a summary of these recent research findings and suggest some local strategies for managing large retail development.

Local and regional shoppers. Consumers enjoy tremendous benefits from the lower prices offered by Wal-Mart and other large discount retailers. For example, prices for various food items in Wal-Mart and other “nontraditional” large discount food retailers are typically 5-48% less than prices for the same product in conventional supermarkets (Hausman & Leibtag, 2006). This generates tremendous savings to consumers in the form of both a direct effect from having lower priced goods available in the community, as well as an indirect effect generated through competition with other retailers. While only those who shop at the large discount retailers benefit directly from lower prices, all shoppers benefit from the competition effect. Basker (2005a) estimates price declines of 7-13% in the long run as the result of a Wal-Mart store opening, with the largest price declines occurring with drugstore items such as toothpaste and shampoo.

Hausman and Leibtag (2006) estimate the savings in food expenditures resulting from entry and expansion of Wal-Mart and other large discount retailers in a community. They find that the direct effect of having access to lower priced goods generates a savings of 20.2% in food...
expenditures for the average household. The competition effect generates additional savings of 4.8%. Thus, the total consumer savings from these combined effects for a household with average income and food expenditures is equal to 25% of the household’s total food expenditures. Not surprisingly, lower income households benefit even more from lower food prices; the estimated savings in expenditures is close to 30% for households with an annual income below $10,000.

Shoppers face potential costs associated with supercenters as well. Service clerks are often less knowledgeable and product variety is more limited in comparison to retail specialty stores. On net, however, the substantial gains to consumers from lower prices are widespread and more than offset these costs.

Local retail workers. While it is certainly true that Wal-Mart provides individuals with employment opportunities, there is some evidence that points to the negative impact that Wal-Mart has on local labor markets. According to Wal-Mart, the average full-time employee (which includes all levels of employees) makes an hourly wage of $10.11—an average annual salary that is roughly equal to the federal poverty line for a family of four.

The impact of lower paying Wal-Mart jobs on local retail employment depends on whether and where workers would be employed in the absence of a Wal-Mart. It is possible that Wal-Mart workers have been displaced from formerly better paying retail jobs, but also possible that they were unemployed or underemployed previously. Two recent national studies examine the effect of a Wal-Mart store entry on total retail employment at a county level. Basker (2005b) finds that the immediate effect of Wal-Mart’s entry is an increase of 100 retail jobs; after 5 years, this number is reduced to an average of 50 jobs. On the other hand, Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2006) find that Wal-Mart entry reduces retail employment at the county level by about 180 workers, which translates into each Wal-Mart worker displacing 1.5 other retail workers. The discrepancy between these results is due to different methods used to identify the causal relationship between Wal-Mart entry and county employment. Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2006) also investigate the influence of a Wal-Mart store opening on retail earnings at a county level. The results indicate that a Wal-Mart store opening leads to a decline in county-level retail earnings of about 2.8%, driven largely by the reduction in retail employment.

Increasing concern has mounted over whether Wal-Mart workers with limited benefits disproportionately rely on public assistance programs (including subsidized healthcare, housing, and food stamps). Goetz and Swaminathan (2006) consider the relationship between Wal-Mart and county poverty rates. Controlling for other factors that may influence poverty rates and for the possibility that poverty rates may influence the location of a new Wal-Mart store, they find that counties with more Wal-Mart stores in 1987 had higher rates of poverty in 1999 than counties with fewer or no Wal-Mart stores. They also find that counties in which new Wal-Mart stores were built between 1987 and 1998 experienced higher poverty rates in 1999. Specifically, the opening of a new Wal-Mart store is found to increase the average poverty rate in a county by 0.2%. In aggregate, the authors estimate that an additional 20,000 families are in poverty as a result of Wal-Mart’s presence in local communities.

Other businesses. Many objections to a new Wal-Mart store have to do with the anticipated negative effects of Wal-Mart on existing retailers. While there is some disagreement over how total retail employment in a county is affected, the impact on small retailers (with fewer than 20 employees) is clear. Basker (2005b) considers small retailers specifically and finds that five years after Wal-Mart’s entry, an average of four small retailers are displaced. In contrast, the number of medium-sized retailers (with 20-99 employees) is estimated to decline only by 0.7 retailers five years afterwards. Jia (2005) estimates a statistical model of large and small retail firms’ entry and exit decisions also using a national sample of U.S. counties. Wal-Mart’s expansion from the late 1980s to late 1990s is found to account for 50-70% of the decline in small retailers.

Because large retailers require relatively large parcels of land, they tend to locate at the edges of a town. This can have clear negative effects on the traditional Main Street shopping district, while bringing potential benefits to complementary stores located on the fringes. However, perhaps because of their “one-stop shopping” appeal, Wal-Mart stores do not appear to have strong attraction effects. Basker (2005b) investigates the influence of a Wal-Mart store on the number of restaurant and automobile dealership jobs within a county, but finds no causal relationship.

Local jurisdiction. The opening of a Wal-Mart store can be a mixed blessing for a town. A new Wal-Mart can
stimulate total retail sales within a community by attracting customers from further away, and thus the local jurisdiction benefits through higher sales tax revenues. However, this depends on the regional distribution of Wal-Mart and other large retail stores and how much of an increase in the local market area a new Wal-Mart store is able to achieve. If large discount retailers are already present, then the local market area may not expand substantially and overall retail sales may not increase.

A study of Iowa rural towns by Stone (1997) found that total sales for the towns in which a Wal-Mart opened increased by six percent two years after the Wal-Mart opened, but after ten years, sales were four percent below the pre-Wal-Mart level. Stone concludes that this downturn probably reflects the opening of several large retail stores in proximate urban areas that, in turn, recaptured trade from the Wal-Mart towns. This dynamic reflects a broader trend of rapid growth in the number of retailers in recent years across the United States; for example, the number of general merchandise retail establishments in the United States increased by 4,000 between 1997 and 2002. Stone, Arzt, and Myles (2002) conclude that in many rural areas, a “zero-sum game” frequently prevails: a new entrant (such as a new Wal-Mart store) captures its sales from existing businesses rather than from a growing market and thus there are often no net gains in sales revenues.

In addition to impacts on local tax revenues, large retail development may generate greater fiscal costs to a community than it generates in revenue, thereby being a drain on fiscal resources. For instance, in a 2002 study of the Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts, it was found that after taking into account new revenues, the net cost to the community of a new large discount retailer was $468/10,000 square feet (Tischler & Associates, Inc., 2002). Vehicle trip generation drives much of these costs. Depending on location and demographics, supercenters in regional shopping centers can generate up to 20,000 average daily car trips (Boarnet & Crane, 1999). Because supercenters typically locate in outer suburban and exurban areas, this can exacerbate the fiscal costs associated with traffic congestion and infrastructure strain.

**Macro-level effects.** Many claims have been made about Wal-Mart’s positive and negative impacts on the national and even global economy. While a thorough review of research on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, we mention two potential impacts because of their relevance to local communities. First, many have asserted that Wal-Mart’s adherence to low prices and their strong bargaining position with suppliers has helped to keep down consumer price inflation. In a study of the national economy, the consulting firm Global Insight Inc. (2005) estimates that the expansion of Wal-Mart from 1985 to 2004 is associated with a 3.1% decline in overall consumer prices as measured by the Consumer Price Index.

Second, many have claimed that Wal-Mart has hastened the flight of U.S. manufacturing jobs overseas through aggressive global sourcing of inputs. Basker and Van (2005) provide evidence that the import share of apparel sales at Wal-Mart stores is substantially higher than the average apparel retailer. However, while such practices may accelerate manufacturing job loss at the national level, the loss of manufacturing jobs from the U.S. is a long term trend that is the result of many global economic and political forces. Global sourcing of manufacturing began in the early 1980s and has happened irrespective of Wal-Mart’s existence and growth.

**Net impacts.** In summary, consumers have benefited from Wal-Mart’s tremendous cost efficiencies in the form of greatly reduced retail prices, which generate substantial savings to U.S. consumers annually. However, evidence also shows that Wal-Mart does not bear the full economic and social costs of its business practices. As a result, the benefits and costs are unevenly distributed across individuals. Those who are employed in non-retail sectors of the economy reap substantial benefits from lower prices and absorb some of the potential costs if tax revenues are needed to cover increased social costs. Those employed in the retail sector absorb the additional cost of lower wages, fewer benefits and a potentially shrinking employment base.

**Strategies for Local Communities**

Communities can attempt to fight the opening of a new Wal-Mart store, but few have been successful in keeping Wal-Mart out permanently. In cases in which a new Wal-Mart store was defeated initially, Wal-Mart has often been successful on the second try. Alternatively, they have simply chosen to locate their store in a neighboring community, a move that may have more adverse impacts on the community that fought the Wal-Mart store.

In communities without large retailers, the opportunity costs of keeping out Wal-Mart or other large discount retailers is high. Without the option of lower priced goods and the competitive pressure that these stores bring, consumers are forced to pay higher prices. On the other hand,
communities that already have several large discount retailers are unlikely to experience further reductions in consumer prices with the addition of another large discount store, but will still experience increasing infrastructure costs and may absorb additional social costs as well. In these cases, the community risks an oversupply of large retailers, which can lead to vacancies in older strip and large retail developments as newer retail outlets out-compete older ones. Thus, the net benefits of additional large discount retailers to a community that already has easy access to such stores are far less and in these cases, the costs of an additional store may easily outweigh the benefits. In light of these considerations, what can a community do? Below we discuss several local options that can improve the net benefits associated with large retail development.

Expand control over retail development. Comprehensive plans should explicitly address large retail development by identifying locations that maximize existing infrastructure and potential attraction effects and that minimize land impacts and traffic congestion. For example, the City of Hailey, Idaho’s 2000 comprehensive plan clearly specifies community goals and implementation procedures that anticipate new retail development. These goals promote the health of the existing downtown (a defined, walkable business core) and fiscally responsible use of existing infrastructure (City of Hailey, Idaho, 2000). St. Petersburg, Florida dictates concurrences for public services (St. Petersburg, Florida, 2005), where concurrency is defined as having the “necessary public facilities and services to maintain the adopted level of service standards that are available when the impacts of development occur (page GID-20).”

Plans, and the tools used to implement plans such as zoning and site design, can dictate the placement of public services (water, sewer, roads) and standards can be instituted that achieve local goals for aesthetics and other development priorities. The zoning ordinance can require adherence to the comprehensive plan, cap the size of retail structures (Easton, Maryland, 2006) or require that any new development over a certain size meet minimum standards as to not adversely impact the community (Greenfield, Massachusetts, 2006). Design and site standards can be enforced that address specifics in regards to the site itself and the form of development (San Jose, California, 2006).

Educate existing retailers. Existing retailers can adopt strategies to co-exist with a large discount retail store such as Wal-Mart (Center for Applied Economic Research, Montana State University, 2002). Smaller retailers should develop strategies for staying competitive with big box competition. Pricing should be at least within 10 to 15% of larger retail stores and the emphasis should be on diversity in merchandise. Small retailers can focus on filling the “voids” in products or services that do not exist in large retail stores and provide high levels of customer service. Promotional campaigns and adequate signage could attract regional Wal-Mart customers into the other retail centers of the community.

Promote long-term local economic development strategies. In the long run, local communities are best served by using their scarce resources to promote long-term economic development rather than to keep out large retail development. This implies understanding global economic forces and identifying strategies that take advantage of these forces to foster economic growth and the creation of higher wage jobs. A good example is Aurora, Nebraska (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas, 2001). Community leaders in Aurora, a town of just over 4,000 people, decided to leverage their assets—local proactive leadership, dedicated community volunteers and an existing high-tech telecommunications company — to create their competitive advantage. In addition, they anticipated the potential labor needs and prior to recruitment instituted a training program for residents to work in this industry. Capitalizing on their technological infrastructure, available labor force and quality of life, Aurora officials were able to woo a couple of high-tech communications firms.

State policy options. There is a clear role for states to play in supporting local planning. The state can provide minimum, sound planning, zoning and design standards dealing with large retail developments that not only provide a good base, but also strengthen local priorities. State laws can support communities by designating large developments as conditional uses and requiring a comprehensive economic and community impact review of any new retail construction that is over a certain footprint.

In recent months some states have passed legislation that mandates a minimum level of benefits provided by large employers such as Wal-Mart. The rationale for such regulation is both philosophical—that firms should pay employees a “living wage”—and practical, since employees with limited benefits may
place greater demands on states’ public health care and other assistance programs. However, this conclusion depends critically on whether large retailers such as Wal-Mart are imposing an additional social burden by displacing retail jobs with better benefits vs. lessening the social burden by providing health care benefits to otherwise unemployed workers. In addition, because such legislation would increase the operating costs of large employers, it could lead to a reduction in the number of employees or an increase in consumer prices. In considering such legislation, the benefits of increased healthcare benefits to workers should be weighed against these potential costs.

For More Information

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